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NIT VS. TOR: A STRUGGLE FOR THE RIGHT TO INTERNET
ANONYMITY
Richard E. Byrne III*
“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured
to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by
the advance of technology.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.2

In other words, the government cannot search and seize people or
their property without a valid warrant backed by probable cause.3
Over the years, the advancement of technology has put the Fourth
Amendment to the test, requiring the Supreme Court to clarify the
law and the extent of both civilian rights and government powers
time and time again.4
We live in a digital age. Not only do our lives revolve around
technology, but so do the actions of criminals and police alike. As
criminals find new ways to exploit technology, the law often
struggles to keep up.5 In some instances, modern technology may
*

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

J.D. Candidate, May 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A.,
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thank the legendary Byron L. Warnken for his guidance and inspiration to him and
countless others throughout the years; the Law Review staff for all their passion and
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dedicates this Comment to the memory of his father, Richard E. Byrne Jr. (1969–
2018).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts III–IV.
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even find itself in a gray area of the law, where judges are left to
apply—and often stretch—the law through their own interpretations.6
Such interpretations may very well differ from one judge to another.7
A prime example of this conundrum is the FBI’s recent acquisition
of a child pornography website and the tactics used to uncover the
identities of numerous patrons of the site.8 Through the use of a
network investigative technique (NIT)—a tool akin to malware—on
the site’s servers, the FBI could prompt users’ computers to
involuntarily send back identifying information that could be used to
locate and arrest the users.9 When the users were charged with
possession of child pornography, many moved to suppress the
evidence on the grounds that their Fourth Amendment rights were
violated.10 Because the defendants are from various states across the
country, they challenged the authority of the Virginia magistrate to
issue an NIT warrant that spanned the entire nation.11 Accordingly,
district courts across the nation have frequently come to different
conclusions on this matter.12 Due to the complexity of modern
technology, the applicability of the Fourth Amendment has been
questioned by many district courts, resulting in numerous conflicting
decisions.13 Whereas some courts have found the NIT’s retrieval of
identifying information to be a Fourth Amendment search, others
have declined to do so, instead choosing to overlook the
distinguishing facts and rely on prior case law which generally held
that individuals have no expectation of privacy in such information.14

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 594–96 (E.D. Va. 2016).
Id. at 594–95. The District Court for the Western District of Arkansas referred to NIT
as malware, using the terms interchangeably. See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp.
3d 920, 927–29 (W.D. Ark. 2016). The court noted that the term “malware” means
“malicious software.” Id. at 927 n.7. Although Agent Alfin of the FBI objected to the
term due to its “derogatory connotation,” he conceded that the term is indeed
descriptive of the NIT. Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1048, 1050 (C.D. Ill. 2016);
United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1085 (S.D. Iowa 2016); United
States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept.
9, 2016); United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL
4208436, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016); Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 592; United
States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
28, 2016).
See cases cited supra note 10.
See cases cited supra note 10.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
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This Comment will explore the incongruities between the decisions
that arose as a result of this specific FBI operation and how the
advancement of technology has fallen into a gray area of law where
the applicability of our constitutional rights has come into question.15
This will be achieved by first examining the events leading up to this
issue.16 This Comment will then explain how the advancement of
technology in our society has shaped and evolved the Fourth
Amendment throughout the years.17 Next, it will explore how the
courts have tackled this issue and where some went wrong.18 Finally,
the issue will be resolved by means of a Katz analysis of one’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in a Tor-concealed IP address, as
well as through a recent amendment made by Congress to the
preexisting law.19
II. FACTUAL HISTORY
The prosecution of numerous individuals was the result of the
FBI’s investigation of Playpen, a website that contained
pornography.20 The FBI was first alerted to the presence of Playpen
in December 2014, when a foreign law enforcement agency
discovered the site and subsequently informed the FBI.21 The forumstyle site was frequented by more than 150,000 total members and
hosted “tens of thousands of postings related to child pornography.”22
Playpen operated solely on “the onion router” or “Tor” network.23
The Tor network was originally created by the United States Naval
Research Laboratory for the purpose of protecting government
communications.24 The service is now publicly available from the
“Tor Project” website, where anyone can download the Tor
browser.25 The use of the Tor network “allows users to access the
Internet in an anonymous fashion” by concealing the user’s Internet
Protocol (IP) address from the sites he visits.26 This is done by
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Parts III–IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593–94 (E.D. Va. 2016).
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 593–94. An IP address is a unique identifying number given to every single
device that connects to the Internet. Tim Fisher, What Is an IP Address?, LIFEWIRE
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passing the user’s IP address between various volunteer-operated
“node” computers located around the world.27 Furthermore, the Tor
network also serves the secondary purpose of granting access to
“hidden services,” websites that can only be accessed via the Tor
network.28 Through the use of the Tor network, a hidden service
website cannot locate its visitors, and vice versa.29 As such, the Tor
network is home to many illegal activities.30 Given the illegal nature
of the site, Playpen operated as one of these hidden services.31
The FBI located the individual operating Playpen and proceeded to
execute a search of his home in Florida on February 19, 2015.32
Rather than shutting Playpen down, the FBI assumed control and
operated it from a government facility in the Eastern District of
Virginia from February 20, 2015, through March 4, 2015. 33 At the
start of the FBI’s operation of Playpen, a federal magistrate judge in
the Eastern District of Virginia authorized a search warrant. 34 This
search warrant authorized the deployment of an NIT on Playpen’s
server “to obtain identifying information from activating
computers.”35 The NIT consisted of computer code that was sent to
the computer accessing Playpen and instructed it to send certain
information to the FBI, unbeknownst to the computer’s user.36 The

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

(Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-an-ip-address-2625920. It is a
special serial number used as a tool for identification, akin to a car’s license plate or a
telephone number. Id. Internet authorities provide large amounts of IP addresses to
regional Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which then assign the IP addresses to every
server and Internet user. See id.
United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016).
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 593.
See id. at 593–94.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 594; United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016).
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 594; Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *2.
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 594. “Activating users” was defined in the warrant as
computers “of any user or administrator who logs into [Playpen] by entering a
username and password.” Id. at 594–95 (alteration in original).
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 595; Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *2. The FBI declined
to give defendants the complete source code to the NIT or provide additional
information as to its operating parameters. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 596. The NIT
is just one of many tools, or so-called “Trojan devices,” used to combat illegal activity
on the Tor network. See Brian L. Owsley, Beware of Government Agents Bearing
Trojan Horses, 48 AKRON L. REV. 315, 316 (2015). Other such tools include: “data
extraction software, . . . port reader, harvesting program, remote search, CIPAV for
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only information needed by the FBI to locate an activating computer
was the IP address, which the government admittedly could not
retrieve without deploying the NIT.37
After the NIT revealed a user’s IP address, the FBI subpoenaed the
users’ Internet Service Provider (ISP) to obtain personal information
regarding the individual’s identity and address.38 After this, the FBI
then sought separate residential search warrants for the defendants’
homes, seizing their computers, as well as other electronics and
storage devices.39
Using this tactic, the FBI was able to locate numerous Playpen
visitors so that they could be charged with crimes pertaining to child
pornography.40 However, many of these individuals filed motions to
suppress evidence on the grounds that their Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures were violated when the
FBI executed the first search warrant that authorized the use of the
NIT.41 The defendants claimed that the NIT warrant was invalid,
resulting in the constitutional equivalent of a warrantless search.42
While the reasons for alleging that the warrant was invalid vary
between each of the cases, each court addressed the issue of whether
the use of the NIT to retrieve an IP address even amounts to a search
under the Fourth Amendment.43 To understand how and why these
courts were at odds with one another, it is imperative to understand
how the constant development of technology has shaped the Fourth
Amendment over the years, as well as the ways courts determine
whether something is subject to Fourth Amendment protection.44

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier, or IPAV for Internet Protocol
Address Verifier.” Id.
Matish, 193 F. Supp. at 595 (listing other information retrieved by the NIT, including:
a “unique identifier generated by the NIT” assigned to each unique computer; the
type, version, and architecture of the activating computer’s operating system;
information about whether the NIT has already been delivered to the activating
computer; “the activating computer’s Host Name”; “the activating computer’s active
operating system username”; and “the activating computer’s media access control
(‘MAC’) address”).
Id. at 595–96.
See id. at 596.
See cases cited supra note 10.
See cases cited supra note 10.
See cases cited supra note 10.
See cases cited supra note 10.
See infra Parts III–IV.
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III. THE TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court
adopted a physical trespass theory to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
had been violated.45 The Court held that wiretapping did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because “[t]here was no searching. There
was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of
the defendants.”46
Nearly four decades later, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme
Court addressed the Fourth Amendment implications of
eavesdropping via electronic surveillance.47 While there was no
Fourth Amendment violation under the physical trespass theory, the
Court determined that the Government had constructively entered the
Defendant’s phone booth through the use of electronic surveillance.48
The Katz Court believed the standard set in Olmstead was inadequate
to provide protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.49
Therefore, it adopted a new Fourth Amendment applicability test.50
The Katz test resolved the applicability of the Fourth Amendment
based on whether the defendant had a “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”51 This test, laid out in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion
and first adopted in Smith v. Maryland,52 relied on two components:
one subjective, and the other objective.53 The first was whether the
defendant held a subjective expectation of privacy.54 The second was
whether society was willing to recognize that subjective expectation
of privacy as being objectively reasonable.55 Despite differing on the
rationale, Justice Harlan agreed with the majority’s holding that the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated when the
Government intercepted his calls through the attachment of an
eavesdropping device to a public telephone booth.56 In its reasoning,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

277 U.S. 438, 463–66 (1928).
Id. at 464.
See 389 U.S. 347, 350, 353–54 (1967).
Id. at 353.
Id.
See id. at 351–53.
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 360–61.
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the Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”57
The 2012 Supreme Court case of United States v. Jones involved
the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle for four weeks
without a valid warrant.58 Prior case law held that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of one’s vehicle
when it is parked in a public place.59 Despite the lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the Court in Jones still found the tracking of
the defendant’s vehicle to be a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights under the physical trespass theory.60 The Court held:
Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz
formulation. At bottom, we must “assur[e] preservation of
that degree of privacy against [the] government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”. . . [F]or most
of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon
the areas (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”) it
enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that understanding.61
The Court explained that the Katz test did not replace the commonlaw trespassory test, but added to it instead.62 It further explained,
through the words of a prior opinion: “[W]e [do not] believe that
Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons and
their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the
protection which the Amendment extends to the home . . . .”63 The
Court held that placing the GPS tracking device on the vehicle
without a valid warrant violated the Fourth Amendment through the
physical trespass theory.64
The Supreme Court case of Kyllo v. United States explored Katz in
a modern sense and stressed the danger that the advancement of
technology posed to our Fourth Amendment rights.65 The Court
tackled the issue of whether the use of thermal imaging technology
that detected heat emanating from the exterior of one’s home was
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012).
E.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05.
Id. at 406–07 (footnotes and citations omitted).
See id.
Id. at 407 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969)).
Id. at 404–05.
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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considered a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.66 The Court
reasoned that the technology was used to gather information
regarding the home’s interior, and thus stated: “To withdraw
protection of . . . [the] minimum expectation [of privacy within one’s
home] would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”67 Noticing that police
technology poses a threat to an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy within their home, the Court held: “Where, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”68
In 2014, the Supreme Court held that police may examine the
physical aspects of an arrestee’s cell phone, but cannot conduct
warrantless searches of the digital data within.69 It reasoned that
“[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a
weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s
escape.”70 It further explained that the data within a cell phone
warrants a degree of privacy, as it may contain personal
communications, photos, Internet-searches of private interests or
concerns, or even a person’s specific movements—all over the course
of an extended period of time.71 The Court even noted that “many of
the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on
their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—
from the mundane to the intimate.”72
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.73 A lack of expectation of privacy has been
found in voluntarily-conveyed information such as numbers dialed on
a phone,74 bank account records,75 tax records,76 and oral
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 40.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 2490.
Id.
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 332, 335–36 (1973);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963).
Smith, 422 U.S. at 743–44.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–44.
Couch, 409 U.S. at 335–36.
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statements.77 This rule has also been widely applied to IP
addresses.78 Courts in the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
held that sharing an IP address with a web service, such as an online
chat service or email account, removes any expectation of privacy a
person has in his IP address.79 However, courts in the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits have taken it a step further by holding that an
individual has no expectation of privacy in his IP address because he
voluntarily shares that information with his ISP upon accessing the
Internet.80
When looking back through the history and evolution of the Fourth
Amendment, it is readily apparent that as technology advanced, there
was a necessity for law to adapt and change along with it.81 The two
ways courts can determine Fourth Amendment applicability—
physical trespass and reasonable expectation of privacy—were
devised due to the need for the law to conform with advances in
technology.82 Whereas one resulted from the progression of physical
technology, namely wiretapping, the other was the product of remote,
electronic technology.83 Even after the two methods of determining
Fourth Amendment applicability were established, courts continued
to hear new cases regarding technology and how it interacted with the
Constitution.84 As such, the law will naturally continue to follow this
77.
78.
79.

80.

81.
82.
83.
84.

White, 401 U.S. at 752; Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465.
See infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
E.g., United States v. Caira, 833 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the
defendant voluntarily shared his IP addresses with Microsoft, so he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in them); United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573–74 (3d
Cir. 2010) (holding that because defendant shared his IP address with the websites he
visited, the government did not need a warrant to obtain that address through the
administrator of one of those websites); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196,
1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that defendant had “no Fourth Amendment privacy
expectation” in his IP address, which he had shared with Yahoo! by using an online
chat service).
United States v. Beckett, 369 F. App’x 52, 56 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address because
that information is “transmitted during internet usage” and “is necessary for the . . .
[Internet Service Providers] . . . to perform their services”); United States v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP addresses of websites he visited because
he voluntarily shared that information with his Internet Service Provider, as was
necessary to view the websites).
See supra notes 45–80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45–57 and accompanying text.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
See supra notes 58–80 and accompanying text.
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pattern as technology continues to become even more advanced and
prevalent in our society. Thus, there is a need for courts to recognize
when technology has surpassed the current limits of constitutional
case law, rather than merely falling back on precedent pertaining to
preexisting technology.
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CONFUSION BEHIND THE
TOR NETWORK
In the aftermath of the FBI’s raid on Playpen, the charged
defendants began to challenge their charges on the grounds of their
Fourth Amendment rights being violated.85 These defendants
motioned to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the warrant
as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”86 District courts around the nation
were forced to analyze whether the NIT warrant was constitutionally
sound.87 When analyzing a motion to suppress evidence allegedly
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, courts must first
determine “whether or not a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ has
occurred.”88 Thus, the district courts generally analyze whether one
has a reasonable expectation in one’s IP address.89
A. Reasonable Expectation in One’s IP Address
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, hearing the case of United States v. Matish, first looked
toward preexisting case law.90 It noted that the Ninth Circuit case of
United States v. Forrester held that a reasonable expectation of
privacy cannot exist in one’s IP address because Internet users
“should know that this information is provided to and used by
Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the
routing of information.”91
However, the court recognized a
distinguishing feature that set Matish apart from Forrester.92 Unlike
Forrester, Matish masked his IP address through the use of the Tor
network.93 Rather than supplying his ISP with information that his IP
address had connected to Playpen, Matish effectively informed his
ISP that he had connected to a randomly-selected node computer
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See cases cited supra note 10.
See cases cited supra note 10.
See cases cited supra note 10.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
See cases cited supra note 10.
193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 613–16 (E.D. Va. 2016).
Id. at 615 (citing United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008)).
See id.
Id.
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elsewhere in the world.94 After glossing over this distinction, the
court then turned to the case of United States v. Farrell, in which the
administrator of Silk Road 2.0—a hidden service notorious for illegal
drug sales—was brought to justice.95 In Farrell, the Western District
of Washington found that no reasonable expectation of privacy
existed in IP addresses hidden via the Tor network.96 The Farrell
court noted that “in order for . . . prospective user[s] to use the Tor
network they must disclose information, including their IP addresses,
to unknown individuals running Tor nodes, so that their
communications can be directed toward their destinations.”97
The Matish court noted that while “Tor markets itself as a tool to
prevent[] people from learning your location,” it also warns visitors
“that the Tor network has vulnerabilities and that users might not
remain anonymous.”98 The court saw Tor’s disclaimer as enough to
“destroy[] any expectation of privacy in a Tor user’s IP address.”99
Accordingly, based on the holding of Farrell, Tor’s disclaimer, and
the opinions of other district courts on this matter, the court held that
any expectation of privacy was merely subjective and in no way
objectively reasonable.100

94.
95.

See id. at 593–94, 615–17.
Id. at 615–16 (citing United States v. Farrell, No. CR15-029RAJ, 2016 WL 705197, at
*1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2016)). Silk Road 2.0 was the successor of Silk Road,
which was founded by Ross Ulbricht (referred to in the community by his pseudonym
of “Dread Pirate Roberts”). Alois Afilipoaie & Patrick Shortis, Silk Road: After Being
Closed Twice, Can the Brand Ever ‘Rise Again?,’ SWANSEA UNIV. 1–2 (Jan.
2015), https://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/GDPO%20SA%20silk%20rd%20rise%20ag
ain.pdf. After Ulbricht was arrested and Silk Road was seized by the FBI in October
2013, several of its administrators created Silk Road 2.0. Id. at 2–3. Silk Road 2.0
and twenty-six other “hidden services” were seized in November 2014 as part of an
international law enforcement operation dubbed “Operation Onymous.” Id.; Julia
Buxton & Tim Bingham, The Rise and Challenge of Dark Net Drug Markets,
SWANSEA UNIV. 15 (Jan. 2015), http://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/23274/1/Darknet%20
Markets.pdf. Brian Farrell was subsequently arrested as an alleged administrator of
Silk Road 2.0 after his IP address was identified by the Software Engineering Institute
of Carnegie Mellon University, which was conducting research on the Tor network.
Farrell, 2016 WL 705197, at *1. Within hours of the site’s seizure, a Silk Road 3.0
was created and remains in “business” to this day. Afilipoaie & Shortis, supra, at 4.
Each iteration of Silk Road has operated exclusively on the Tor network. See id. at 1.
96. Farrell, 2016 WL 705197, at *2.
97. Id.
98. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 615–16 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
99. Id. at 617.
100. Id. at 615–17.
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However, the Matish court discovered a discrepancy between the
current fact pattern and the one presented in Farrell.101 It noted that
“the NIT used in this case poses questions unique from the conduct at
issue in Farrell.”102 In Farrell, the government played no role in
uncovering the user’s IP address.103 Instead, Farrell’s IP address was
given to the government by researchers who were operating a node
that he connected to.104 In contrast, the FBI obtained Matish’s IP
address by sending the NIT code directly into his computer and
prompting it to send the desired information to the FBI’s computer.105
Despite this major difference, the court made a finding similar to
other district courts, which suggested that knowingly connecting
one’s IP address to a third party serving as a Tor node is enough to
topple any subjective expectation of privacy.106 Thus, the court held
that “any such subjective expectation of privacy—if one even existed
in this case—is not objectively reasonable.”107
This determination—this dismissal of a key fact—defies logic. By
the reasoning of the Matish court, no communication to any other
person would warrant a subjective—much less a reasonably
objective—expectation of privacy.108 Even if one were to privately
pass another person a note in an empty, locked room, as long as there
exists the possibility of that person revealing the contents of that note,
the government would be justified in breaking into the room and
reading its contents.
To go even further—in terms of this metaphor—the Matish court
would likely suggest that the individual even lacks any expectation of
privacy to the locked room itself. Indeed, the court proclaimed that
101. Id. at 617.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id.; see also United States v. Farrell, No. CR 15-029RAJ, 2016 WL 705197, at *1
(noting that Farrell’s IP address was identified by the Software Engineering Institute
of Carnegie Mellon University during the course of its research on the Tor network).
104. Farrell, 2016 WL 705197, at *1.
105. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 595, 617.
106. Id. at 617. The Western District of Arkansas, one of the other district courts, similarly
opined that “on its very first hop, the TOR user’s true IP address is disclosed to the
first node computer in the TOR chain. Thus, the user’s true IP address is not a
complete secret.” United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 933 (W.D. Ark. 2016).
This court further stated that a Tor user takes risks in revealing his IP address to both
his Internet Service Provider and the owner of the first node computer in the Tor
chain, as either one could provide information to the government. Id. Under this
reasoning, the Arkansas district court found no reasonable expectation of privacy as to
the defendant’s IP address, thus no Fourth Amendment implication and no
requirement for the FBI to procure a valid warrant. Id.
107. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 616.
108. See id.
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individuals do not even have a reasonable expectation of privacy
within their own computers.109 Despite noting that “[t]he Ninth
Circuit found in 2007 that connecting to a network did not eliminate
the reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s computer,”110 the court
claimed that “hacking is much more prevalent now than it was even
nine years ago, and the rise of computer hacking via the Internet has
changed the public’s reasonable expectations of privacy.”111 While
the court tried to emphasize this point with numerous articles
concerning hacking, it failed to realize the irony in the fact that a
majority of the articles discuss major businesses, governments, and
other high-profile targets—not private individuals.112
While the average individual might not have as much security
against hacking as a business or government might, common sense
dictates that an experienced hacker would have little to no interest in
the contents of the average citizen’s computer. As for run-of-the-mill
viruses and malware, most can be avoided with diligence and
antivirus software.113 A minimal amount of precaution can keep the
average person from exposing his computer to hacking, just like the
precaution of using Tor managed to keep many IP addresses from
being discovered by the FBI, causing the agency to resort to the use
of NIT malware.114 However, the Matish court neglected to consider
such precautions, and instead stated that, “in today’s digital world, it
appears to be a virtual certainty that computers accessing the Internet
can—and eventually will—be hacked.”115
The Matish court likens hacking to an officer taking advantage of a
set of broken blinds so that he can peer into one’s home.116 To the
contrary, the use of NIT (or any other form of hacking) appears to
109. See id. at 615–16.
110. Id. at 618 (citing United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146–47 (9th Cir.
2007)).
111. Id. at 619.
112. Id. (citing instances of hacking which targeted Apple, politicians, Ashley Madison,
Sony, Home Depot, Target, the New York Times, a law firm specializing in
intellectual property, and the United States government).
113. What Are Some Tips for Avoiding Computer Viruses?, UAB INFO. TECH., https://www
.uab.edu/it/home/it-reports-and-publications/item/229-what-are-some-tips-for-avoidin
g-computer-viruses (last modified Oct. 18, 2012).
114. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 594–95.
115. Id. at 619.
116. Id. at 620 (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 85 (1998)). It is important to note
that the Supreme Court in Carter never reached the issue of whether peering through
broken blinds constituted a “search.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 91. Instead, it was Justice
Breyer who stated in his concurring opinion that he believed such conduct did not
violate anyone’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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more closely resemble an officer using the vulnerability of a thin,
glass window to shatter it, reach inside, and raise the blinds himself.
The FBI could not merely take a closer look to peer inside of a Tor
user’s computer and subsequently identify his IP address; it had to
actively exploit the weaknesses of the Tor network and the user’s
computer and force the computer to send over the desired
information.117
In short, Matish missed the big picture. A person should not lose a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer simply because he
connects to the Internet. The court was on the right track when it
cited 2007 case law that says exactly that, but it quickly veered off
course when it claimed that hacking is more prevalent today, with
only high-profile targets as its examples.118 While Matish rejects any
such notion in the affirmative,119 it begs the question of whether the
use of Tor or other tools to ensure security and anonymity would
raise one’s subjective expectation of privacy to the level of objective
reasonableness.
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in One’s Computer
In the Western District of Texas, the district court hearing the case
of United States v. Torres answered the questions of reasonable
expectation of privacy in a more simplistic manner.120 Rather than
struggling with the separate questions of whether an expectation of
privacy existed in either Torres’s computer or IP address, and with
case law in these issues being rather scarce, the court thought outside
the box.121 The Torres court relied on the 2014 Supreme Court case
of Riley v. California, which found that “individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phones, due to the
extensive amount of personal information contained therein.”122
Presumably, due to the fact that modern-day cell phones are
essentially miniature, handheld computers, the Torres court
determined that “it is reasonable to find that persons also have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal computers, due to
the vast amount of personal information they contain.”123 While the
court kept its explanation on this point rather brief,124 it could be
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 595.
Id. at 617–19.
Id. at 620.
No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016).
See id.
Id. (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)).
Id.
See id.
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understood that the court suggested that both computers and the
information within (i.e. IP addresses) are of such personal
importance, that an individual would naturally have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in both.
Conversely, whilst rejecting the assertion by many of the other
district courts that a person lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his IP address alone, the court seemed to suggest that the FBI’s
conduct was so flagrant in its aim that it need apply neither the
physical trespass theory nor the Katz test.125 Instead, the court
explained:
[T]he NIT placed code on Mr. Torres’ computer without his
permission, causing it to transmit his IP address and other
identifying data to the government. That Mr. Torres did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address is
of no import. This was unquestionably a “search” for
Fourth Amendment purposes.126
Other district courts have reached similar conclusions on this
matter.127 In Florida, the district court addressing the case of United
States v. Adams cautioned against viewing the issue under the narrow
scope of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a Tor
user’s IP address and instructed that the proper subject of the analysis
is the defendant’s computer.128 The Adams court found that a Fourth
Amendment search occurred because “Defendant’s IP address was
discovered only after property residing within Defendant’s home—
his computer—was searched by the NIT.”129 The court also
described its legal reasoning in the form of an analogy:
[A] defendant has an expectation of privacy in his garage,
even if that defendant lacks an expectation of privacy in the
stolen vehicle parked in the garage. Remove the stolen car
from the garage, and no expectation of privacy in the
vehicle exists. An IP address located in the “open” is akin
to a stolen car parked on the street. However, the agents
were required to deploy the NIT to search the contents of
125.
126.
127.
128.

See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
No. 6:16-cr-11-Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016)
(stating that although there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in defendant’s IP
address, the proper subject of the analysis should be the computer).
129. Id.
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Defendant’s laptop, and Defendant enjoyed a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that device.130
A Massachusetts district court in the case of United States v.
Anzalone relied on the reasoning in Adams, and further noted that
[w]hile the most critical piece of information obtained by
the NIT warrant may have been the IP address, the NIT
afforded the government access to six other pieces of
identifying information that were not readily available to
law enforcement, as well as the ability to pair a user’s
actions on Playpen with the user’s IP address.131
Despite such compelling reasoning, some might be inclined to
disagree with the simplistic suggestion that a reasonable expectation
of privacy in one’s computer is sufficient on its own to establish the
existence of a Fourth Amendment search.132 The Fourth Circuit has
held that “the appropriate [Fourth Amendment] inquiry . . . [is]
whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
area searched, not merely in the items found.”133 While this suggests
that the Torres court’s analysis of reasonable expectation of privacy
in one’s computer is proper, it also stands to reason that the inverse is
also true: analyzing one’s expectation of privacy in only the area
itself—in this instance, the computer—while ignoring whether any
expectation of privacy exists in the items found, would not be
appropriate, particularly when such items are willingly presented to
others over a network.
The Torres opinion, while taking a completely different approach,
is similar to Matish in the sense that both circumvent the issue of
whether taking steps to conceal one’s IP address—to the extent that
not even the FBI can discover it (unless reported by the operator of a
node computer or retrieved by invasive means such as the NIT)—
could cause an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy in his IP
address to become objectively reasonable in the eyes of society.134
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 366 (D. Mass. 2016).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Horowitz, 806 F.2d 1222, 1224 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that
an individual must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, not
just in the items found).
133. Id. (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–06 (1980)).
134. Compare United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (holding that Torres had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his computer, but neglecting to address whether concealing an IP address
was objectively reasonable), with United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 616–
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V. SOLUTION
Surely, there are an abundance of superb arguments regarding
whether the use of the NIT constitutes a Fourth Amendment search—
even beyond those described above. Generally speaking, analyzing
solely the IP address under the Katz test results in a finding of no
Fourth Amendment search,135 whereas a Katz analysis of one’s
personal computer typically gives the opposite result.136 With such
limited authority on the matter, all of which can be easily
distinguished by the present key factor of Tor’s IP-shielding function,
it is no wonder why the courts across the nation are at odds with one
another on how to resolve the constitutional issues surrounding the
competing technologies of the NIT and Tor.137
While the analyses conducted by the various courts tend to revolve
around whether there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy in
either the user’s IP address or computer,138 both methods of applying
the Katz test, without more, are flawed. While case law might
suggest that the area searched—in this instance, the computers—is
the proper subject of the analysis,139 it is still important to note that a
Tor user’s IP address is still volunteered to the user’s ISP and the
owner of the node computer it connects to.140 Therefore, regardless
of whether the area searched requires a Katz analysis, the IP address
still requires the same analysis, as it is being volunteered to third
parties for limited purposes.141
A. Putting Tor’s Privacy Feature to the (Katz) Test
Although many of the district courts analyzed whether the
defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy to their IP
addresses, most relied on existing case law that suggested that IP
addresses are not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy
because they are openly shared with third parties when they connect

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

140.
141.

17 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that Matish’s expectation of privacy in his IP address was
not reasonable, but neglecting to consider whether concealing an IP address could be
objectively reasonable).
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See, e.g., United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 366 (D. Mass. 2016);
United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-cr-11-Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 10, 2016).
See supra notes 26–27, 73–80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50–57, 62–63 and accompanying text.
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to the Internet.142 However, this generalization is improper. Rather
than sharing the IP address, and, by extension, the information of
what sites its owner is visiting on the web, with ISPs and the owner
of every site visited, the function of Tor limits the IP address’s
exposure to two parties: the user’s ISP and the owner of the first node
computer.143 Furthermore, neither the ISP nor the owner of the first
node computer would know the target destination of the Tor user,
especially in the event that several nodes are used along the way.144
Conversely, the owner of the site being connected to does not know
the actual IP address of the person visiting it.145 It is for precisely
this reason that the FBI was unable to retrieve the IP addresses of
Playpen members without having to place the NIT malware on their
computers through the Playpen site itself.146 It is no stretch to say
that Tor’s function completely alters the way IP addresses interact on
the Internet, which results in a tangled web of privacy. 147 As such, it
is improper to subject an IP address under these circumstances to the
same reasoning—such as the analysis of Forrester—used to analyze
a default IP address under Katz.
Instead, the proper inquiry should be whether an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address while obscuring it
through the use of Tor. While Matish conducted an analysis to this
effect, the court reached its conclusion that no reasonable expectation
of privacy could possibly exist through the premise of hacking
142. See supra Section IV.A.
143. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. Traditionally, without the use of Tor,
one browsing the Internet would be openly sharing his IP address, his general
geographical location, and the information regarding what site he is connecting to
with numerous parties including his own Internet Service Provider, the owner of each
site he visits, the Internet Service Providers that host each site visited, and even other
third parties, such as those responsible for online advertisements. See Fisher, supra
note 26.
144. See Owsley, supra note 36, at 341. The exception to this statement is the scenario that
occurred in Farrell, where researchers, rather than the government, discovered the IP
address. See United States v. Farrell, No. CR15-029RAJ, 2016 WL 705197, at *1.
While the Farrell opinion is similar to those arising from the NIT situation in the
sense that it is a ruling merely on a pretrial motion, it is unlike them in the sense that it
is a rather brief opinion with scarce details as to how the events unfolded. Authorities
were given Farrell’s IP address by the owners of the node he connected to: a
university-based research program being funded by the Department of Defense. Id. It
is unclear how the node’s owner discovered Farrell’s destination, although it seems
highly likely that it similarly implemented the use of a “Trojan horse device” as
described previously. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
145. Owsley, supra note 36, at 341.
146. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 594–95 (E.D. Va. 2016).
147. See id. at 593–95.
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becoming more prevalent in today’s society.148 As previously
discussed, such a premise is flawed, as it fails to account for
precautions the average person can take when browsing the Internet
and would suggest that a search of one’s locked suitcase would be
permissible merely because the lock could be easily broken.149
Similarly, the argument that a third party—namely the owner of the
connected node—could possibly disclose the IP address to the
authorities is equally flawed.150 While the owner of the node is
indeed a stranger—thus making it unreasonable that one would
expect any degree of confidentiality—it is almost equally unlikely
that the individual would know the Tor user’s destination without the
use of tools similar to that of the NIT in order to track all subsequent
node connections.151 Courts must take caution in declaring that the
mere possibility that a third party could disclose the information,
regardless of whether they had knowledge of any illicit activities, is
enough to destroy a potential reasonable expectation of privacy.
Such reasoning could just as easily be applied in finding no Fourth
Amendment search in the interception of text messages, emails, and
phone calls.
Relying on either of the above rationales creates a slippery slope
that could strip away the Fourth Amendment rights from citizens
merely because an intrusion or unintended disclosure is possible,
rather than probable. Courts, in determining the reasonableness in
one’s subjective expectations, should instead question the probability
of such occurrences. Where a high probability of intrusion or
disclosure exists, an expectation of privacy is more likely to be
unreasonable.152
1.

The Subjective Prong

The first step of a Katz analysis is to determine whether the
individual has a subjective expectation of privacy. 153 While Matish
makes a valid point regarding Tor’s own disclaimer that the Tor
network may have “vulnerabilities” that may not always keep the
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 615–17, 619–20.
See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
This should not be read to mean that a high probability will always result in
unreasonableness. A car parked in a high-crime neighborhood containing an
expensive stereo in plain view has a good probability of being broken into. However,
this fact alone would not justify police in forcing entry to the vehicle.
153. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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user anonymous,154 it should be viewed as a single factor under the
totality of the circumstances. While Tor does provide such a
disclaimer, it is not in plain view on its home page.155 Instead, its
home page advertises that “Tor prevents people from learning your
location or browsing habits,” and includes a statement on “Why
Anonymity Matters,” which explains that “Tor protects you by
bouncing your communications around a distributed network of
relays run by volunteers all around the world: it prevents somebody
watching your Internet connection from learning what sites you visit,
and it prevents the sites you visit from learning your physical
location.”156 Such an explanation of Tor’s functions, despite how
rudimentary it may seem, is indeed true, given the fact that not even
the FBI could track down its users’ identities through traditional,
noninvasive means.157
The privacy feature that Tor offers is its main purpose.158 The fact
that illicit “hidden services” use Tor is no mere coincidence, but
rather a testament to its technological prowess.159 Between the
claims Tor itself makes, the factual description of how it works, and
the fact that it is well-renowned—or perhaps notorious—for its
capabilities, it is clear how one could easily hold a subjective
expectation of privacy in his IP address while it is being concealed by
Tor.
2.

The Objective Prong

The second, final, and most challenging step of the Katz test is to
establish that the individual’s expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable.160 This half of the Katz test, in this context, asks whether
our society would accept an individual’s expectation of privacy in his
IP while obscured by the Tor network as reasonable.161
We live in a society that has been consistently employing
technology for security purposes. Over the decades, we have seen
the rise of surveillance cameras, metal detectors, digital passwords on
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 616 (E.D. Va. 2016).
See TOR, https://www.torproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
Id.
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 593–95.
See Tor: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last
visited Apr. 20, 2018).
159. See Andy Greenberg, It’s About to Get Even Easier to Hide on the Dark Web, WIRED
(Jan. 20, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/get-even-easier-hide-darkweb/.
160. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
161. See id.

2018

The Struggle for the Right to Internet Anonymity

433

devices and services, firewalls, antivirus software, and various other
security measures used in our daily lives. Not even a century ago,
many of our modern-day security measures would have been viewed
as something straight out of a science-fiction novel. Yet, the
necessity for both convenience and security in our society has led to
outstanding technology and technological security measures to
match. Surely, a similar thought must have been in mind when the
United States Naval Research Laboratory invented the tool now
known as “Tor.”162
The Internet has become an icon of modern-day technology and
convenience. As of 2016, over three-fourths of all people in the
United States use the Internet.163 To access the Internet, one typically
must connect to it through an ISP.164 Although this connection may
be secure from most other individuals, it is anything but private, as
one’s IP address and geographical location is disclosed to the ISP and
the operator of any website being accessed.165 Many people who are
aware of this fact and are unsatisfied with the lack of full privacy and
anonymity have turned to services such as Tor to add an extra layer
of protection and privacy.166 Although Tor users must still connect
their IP address to a node computer, the amount of disclosure through
Tor is minimal, especially in comparison to Internet use without it.167
It is imperative to note that Tor is not some niche software that is
only used by a handful of people. In 2010 alone, Tor was
downloaded over thirty-six million times.168 Several institutions,
recognizing Tor’s potential for security, have provided grants to the
Tor Project, including Google, Human Rights Watch, and even the

162. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
163. See Individuals Using the Internet (% of Population), WORLD BANK, https://data.wo
rldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?end=2016&start=1960&view=chart
(last
visited Apr. 20, 2018) (showing that the total percentage of the United States
population using the Internet in 2016 reached 76 percent).
164. Tim Fisher, Internet Service Provider (ISP), LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/in
ternet-service-provider-isp-2625924 (last updated Apr. 11, 2018).
165. See id.; see also Cale Guthrie Weissman, What Is an IP Address and What Can It
Reveal About You?, BUS. INSIDER (May 18, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.businessins
ider.com/ip-address-what-they-can-reveal-about-you-2015-5 (explaining that geolocation is shared in an IP address).
166. See, e.g., Nathaniel Rich, The American Wikileaks Hacker, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 1,
2010), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/meet-the-american-hacker-behindwikileaks-20101201 (noting that Jacob Appelbaum, an American member of
Wikileaks, uses Tor in the Wikileaks operation).
167. See id.
168. Id.
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United States military.169 Additionally, activist groups such as the
Electronic Frontier Foundation have praised Tor’s capabilities and
recommend it “as a mechanism for maintaining civil liberties
online.”170 Even the International Broadcasting Bureau, part of the
Broadcasting Board of Governors—an independent United States
agency—supports Tor development for countries where safe access
to free media is restricted or unlawful.171
Countless people and institutions have taken note of the security
and anonymity the Tor network can provide.172 The Tor Project itself
publicly provides an in-depth, technical explanation, complete with
diagrams, of how the network functions and provides more security
to its users compared to those who connect to websites directly.173
For these reasons, our society—one that values security, privacy, and
safety (and often utilizes technology to achieve it)—would most
certainly be willing to find that an individual’s perceived expectation
of privacy in his IP address is perfectly reasonable when it is shielded
by world-renown, technologically-sound software.
The public information available on the history of Tor and how it
functions more than supports a subjective expectation of privacy in
one’s IP address when it is masked by the Tor network.174 Likewise,
the aforementioned information, combined with the public’s
acceptance of Tor’s capabilities supports a finding that there is an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy as well.175 Thus, both
prongs of the Katz test would be satisfied, which indicates that the
use of the NIT or other means to invade a Tor user’s computer and
retrieve his IP address constitutes a Fourth Amendment search;
accordingly, to take actions in obtaining one’s hidden IP address or
other concealed information would first require a valid warrant.176
Therefore, Matish and like-minded courts are incorrect in declaring

169. Id.
170. Tor: Overview, supra note 158.
171. See Tor: Sponsors, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en (last
visited Apr. 20, 2018) (listing current and former sponsors); see also Who Uses Tor?,
TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en (last visited Apr. 20, 2018)
(explaining that individuals living “behind national firewalls or under the surveillance
of repressive regimes” use Tor).
172. See Who Uses Tor?, supra note 171.
173. Tor: Overview, supra note 158.
174. See id.; see also Who Uses Tor?, supra note 171 (describing how users expect Tor to
help protect and maintain their privacy while using the Internet).
175. See supra notes 163–74 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 50–55, 68, 174–75 and accompanying text.
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B. Statutory Implications
Changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) in
2016 also suggest that a valid warrant is required to overcome the
obstacles Tor causes for the administration of justice.178 Throughout
that year, there was much disagreement between the various district
courts over the constitutionality of the NIT searches and whether the
NIT warrant issued in the Eastern District of Virginia was valid
outside of the jurisdiction under Rule 41 of the FRCrP.179 Congress,
presumably taking note of the judicial incongruity, amended Rule 41,
and the changes became effective on December 1, 2016.180 The
amendment brought the adoption of FRCrP 41(b)(6)(A), which reads:
[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where
activities related to a crime may have occurred has authority
to issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic
storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored
information located within or outside that district if . . . the
district where the media or information is located has been
concealed through technological means.181
Although this new text does not expressly refer to IP addresses and
the use of Tor or similar software, it is heavily implied by the timing
and the circumstances surrounding this amendment that this scenario
is exactly what Rule 41(b)(6)(A) is aimed at resolving.182

177. See supra notes 79–80, 108, 153–76 and accompanying text.
178. See Susan Hennessey, Rule 41: Resolving Procedural Debates to Face the Tough
Questions on Government Hacking, LAWFARE (Dec. 1, 2016, 2:38 PM), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/rule-41-resolving-procedural-debates-face-tough-questions-governm
ent-hacking#.
179. Id.
180. See id. Prior to the amendment, the rule laid out various scenarios in which a
magistrate judge was permitted to issue a warrant, including exceptions to the general
rule that a magistrate could not issue a warrant outside of his own jurisdiction. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1)–(5) (2014) (amended 2016). However, none of the
exceptions appeared to exempt the use of the NIT and similar tools from the general
rule. See id.
181. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(A).
182. See Hennessey, supra note 178 (“The amendment is designed to authorize the
issuance of precisely the kind of search warrant the FBI obtained in the Playpen
operation.”).
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This new exception means a lot more than merely allowing
magistrate judges to issue warrants in scenarios such as those seen in
the Playpen FBI operation. The fact that Congress added this
language in an amendment means that the use of NIT or similar tools
to bypass software such as Tor is in fact a search under the Fourth
Amendment, thus requiring a valid warrant. While there is nothing in
the rule that expressly demands a warrant be issued to utilize such
tools, it seems apparent, by its granting of authority to grant such
warrants, that a warrant is necessary.
After all the disagreement and confusion between district courts,183
Congress seems to have quelled their bickering and resolved this
issue.184 Should any courts continue to struggle with the issue of
whether or not a warrant is mandated for the use of the NIT or any
other “Trojan horse device” in the government’s arsenal, it may come
down to federal courts to interpret FRCrP 41(b)(6)(A). However, at
least for now, the amendment appears to be the answer to this
situation, regardless of whether the courts agree with its implications.
VI. CONCLUSION
Time and time again, our judicial history has shown a need for the
law to adapt to our evolving society and its many technological
advancements.185 In 2016, district courts across the nation struggled
with yet another instance of the law lagging behind technology.186
When individuals found ways to further complicate the functions of
IP addresses to enhance their privacy, law enforcement was required
to develop and utilize tools to uncover the identities and locations of
criminals using technology to remain anonymous.187 Whereas the
law at the time authorized the issuing of warrants for law
enforcement to utilize technology in a variety of ways, the use of the
NIT to uncover an anonymous user was not one of them. 188 When it
was revealed that the law did not account for the use of either
technology, courts were left to argue whether a warrant was even
183. Id. (discussing the fact that prior to the amendment, federal district court judges had
“diverged significantly in their analyses and conclusions” regarding cases relating to
the issue of “whether the warrant for a network investigative technique designed to
obtain the IP address of computers accessing contraband child sexual abuse materials,
authorized in the Eastern District of Virginia, violated Rule 41 when applied to
computers outside that district”).
184. Id.
185. See supra Part III.
186. See supra Parts II, IV.
187. See supra Part II.
188. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1)–(5) (2014) (amended 2016).
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required for such a purpose.189 However, it appears as though the law
has once again caught up with society, with the amendment to FRCrP
41.190
All in all, this is yet another prime example of the law’s inability to
keep up with our society’s technological developments, and the
necessity for it to do so. As a result, countless hours and dollars were
spent on litigation across the nation, and much frustration ensued.
Yet, as the saying goes: “History tends to repeat itself.” It is only a
matter of time before this digital age of ours tests the limits of the law
once more.

189. See supra Part IV.
190. See supra Section V.B.
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